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ABSTRACT  
 
Behavior in the context of game theory is described as a natural 
process that follows the 2nd law of thermodynamics. The rate of 
entropy  increase  as  the  payoff  function  is  derived  from  
statistical physics of open systems. The thermodynamic 
formalism relates everything in terms of energy and describes 
various ways to consume free energy. This allows us to 
associate game theoretical models of behavior to physical 
reality. Ultimately behavior is viewed as a physical process 
where flows of energy naturally select ways to consume free 
energy as soon as possible. This natural process is, according to 
the profound thermodynamic principle, equivalent to entropy 
increase in the least time. However, the physical portrayal of 
behavior does not imply determinism. On the contrary, 
evolutionary equation for open systems reveals that when there 
are three or more degrees of freedom for behavior, the course of 
a game is inherently unpredictable in detail because each move 
affects motives of moves in the future. Eventually, when no 
moves are found to consume more free energy, the extensive-
form game has arrived at a solution concept that satisfies the 
minimax theorem. The equilibrium is Lyapunov-stable against 
variation in behavior within strategies but will be perturbed by a 
new strategy that will draw even more surrounding resources to 
the game. Entropy as the payoff function also clarifies motives 
of collaboration and subjective nature of decision making. 
 
 
1. Introduction * 
 
Game theory for the mathematical modeling of human behavior originates from John von Neumann 
and John Nash who both drew inspiration from the behavior of thermodynamic systems [1]. Curiously 
though applications of game theory in physics and chemistry remain few whereas the breadth of 
applications has grown impressive otherwise and covers diverse disciplines, most notably economics 
[2], biology [3] and social sciences [4,5] as well as engineering [6], computer and information sciences 
[7] and also extends to models of biochemical and biophysical processes [8]. Therefore, when 
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considering the broad scope of game theory, could it be, just as the pioneers envisioned, that there is 
after all a profound connection between behavior and physical processes via a universal natural law 
that underlies the model of behavior in the many forms of games?  
The common basic structure of all games implies on one hand that there is some universal principle 
underlying behavior of systems. On the other hand, game theory contains a considerable dispersion of 
variants, each tailored to model outcomes of specific strategic situations. In particular there is no 
consensus about a universal payoff function, denoted pi(s) for a strategy profile s =  (s1,...,si), whose 
maximization, i.e., payoff pi(s*) for the optimal strategy s*, would cover all incentives of player i in 
competition with other players -i. The difficulty in formulating a universal theory of games that would 
enclose diverse disciplines seems to relate to what exactly the behavior aims to maximize. In fact, 
when considering the variety of circumstances that are confronted during various decision making 
processes, it may appear inconceivable that there could possibly be a universal payoff function.  
In economics the payoffs are customarily summed up simply as money or, when all other desirables 
are included, the payoff is referred to as 'utility' ui(s) or expected utility Ei(s). On the other hand, utility 
is an elusive concept, which makes it difficult to assign realistic numerical payoff values. Thus, it 
seems problematic to find an accurate and quantitative formulation for all motive forces that underlie 
behavior. Moreover, in the light of any chosen payoff, an individual (referred to as a player) appears at 
times  to  act  irrationally,  e.g.,  seems  to  settle  for  suboptimal  personal  payoff  depending  on  other  
players’ actions, even when considered from the perspective of optimizing over multiple sequential 
games. Also, players may seem to act inconsistently with respect to their past actions, sometimes 
almost ‘for the sake of it’. Various ways to explain these perplexing findings with bounded rationality 
[9] have been pursued. While a consensus is still lacking, the discussion may benefit from the ideas 
offered herein. 
In biology, too, the choice of payoff is crucial to modeling behavior realistically. The payoff may be 
equated with fitness but similarly to utility there is no generally accepted way of quantifying fitness 
[10]. Depending on the situation, either reproduction rates or steady-state population densities could be 
used, but these may lead to different outcomes [8]. Nevertheless, in the context of behavioral ecology, 
an important breakthrough was made when natural selection alone as the profound principle, was 
found to prevent alternative strategies from invading a population that is practicing an evolutionarily 
stable strategy [11]. 
In this paper we will re-inspect the theory of games from the physical perspective using the second 
law of thermodynamics. The intention here is not to present a new model or to improve on game 
theoretical models. Instead, the aim is to map game theoretical concepts into their physical 
counterparts and to elucidate that game theory is successful in modeling the behavior of various kinds 
of systems because the behavior itself is a physical process that is governed by a universal principle. 
This task, despite paralleling the original ideas of von Neumann and Nash, is motivated by the recent 
derivation of the principle of increasing entropy as an equation of motion from the statistical physics of 
open systems [12]. The revised statistical theory is not limited to closed systems but describes various 
natural processes, both inanimate and animate, including behavior of biological, economic and cultural 
systems [13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22]. According to the 2nd law all  these systems at  various levels 
of nature’s hierarchy consume free energy as quickly as possible. This observation leads to the 
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proposition that the behavior of many systems, including decision-making processes, could be 
described as a natural process so that entropy is the universal payoff function. 
 
2. The Progress of a Game as a Natural Process 
 
The theory of games, as it was formulated by von Neumann, is based on thermodynamics which, in 
turn, follows from statistical mechanics. When depicting behavior as a physical process directed by 
various incentives, it was not strange for von Neumann, as a physicist, to compare all exchangeable 
entities, i.e., assets, in terms of energy and to relate any asset to the average energy density per entity 
kBT in the thermodynamic system. It was only when applying the thermodynamic formula to complex 
practical systems that von Neumann, in collaboration with economist Oskar Morgenstern abandoned 
the principle idea to map one-to-one a physical system to an economical system [1]. When announcing 
that  money  will  serve  as  the  payoff,  von  Neumann  and  Morgenstern  were  deeply  aware  of  the  
limitations caused by the adopted approximation but could not do better.  
Likewise, when Nash formulated the equilibrium concept that carries his name, he adopted the 
notion  of  chemical  equilibrium  from  Gibbs  [23].  However,  Nash  did  not  aim  to  make  a  one-to-one  
mapping of mathematical variables to energy densities of chemical compounds but recognized the 
resemblance. Nonetheless it is common, especially in economics [24], to see an analogy between the 
progress  of  a  chemical  reaction  toward  the  thermodynamic  equilibrium  and  the  progress  of  a  game  
toward a Nash equilibrium. The similarities between mathematical models and physical realizations 
may be even more apparent in evolutionary game theory where mixed strategies si are commonly 
interpreted as portions of a population expressing a specific behavior. According to this interpretation, 
suggested by Nash [25], population densities keep changing, just like reactant concentrations, until a 
stable point is reached. The steady state of an ecosystem depends on surrounding conditions, just as the 
chemical equilibrium is a function of temperature according to Le Chatelier’s principle [26]. The 
stability of a solution condition may also be lost when a new strategy emerges, corresponding to an 
addition of a new agent, such as a catalyst, into a chemical reaction mixture. Likewise, the stationary 
point may shift when a new species is introduced in an ecosystem. The new species with its 
characteristic behavior may use resources that were unreachable to its predecessors. At these critical 
events [27], known also bifurcations [28], the old, inferior strategies give way to new, superior 
strategies as the system evolves further.  
Since von Neumann and Nash, studies in human behavior in various controlled circumstances, 
referred to as games, have given rise to stricter and broader solution concepts to classify equilibria as 
well  as  to  different  kinds  of  games  to  model  various  situations.  For  example,  in  the  basic  zero-sum  
game the players exchange assets among each other whereas in a non-zero-sum game they also 
compete for external resources. In terms of physics the former variant of the general theme 
corresponds to a closed and fixed energy ensemble that behaves as a Hamiltonian system [29] whereas 
the latter corresponds to an open system that acquires energy from its surroundings. A game is called 
non-generic if a small change to one of the payoffs may remove or add a Nash equilibrium. This means 
in  terms  of  physics  that  such  a  system  is  not  sufficiently  statistical.  For  example  a  corresponding  
extensive-form game will progress further when a player with a new strategy gains access to additional 
assets from the exterior and therefore extending the boundaries of the game. This will increase the 
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payoff.  In  the  same  way  a  non-Hamiltonian  thermodynamic  system  will  evolve  further  when  a  new  
reaction component or mechanism gains access to additional free energy. This path-dependent process 
will increase entropy which, according to the basic maxim of chemical thermodynamics is equivalent 
to the decrease in free energy. 
In the quest for a universal theory of games it is of interest that evolutionary game theory 
demonstrates scale-independents forms of games [30]. It is successful in explaining various ecological 
scenarios where populations compete with each other in the same way as individuals. Moreover, 
evolutionarily stable strategies of population games and the Nash equilibria of decision-making games 
usually coincide. These examples of scale-free games imply that sentient, population and inanimate 
processes are basically alike and operate under a common imperative, only at different scales. Yet 
there has been much debate about what exactly the players, may they be molecules, cells, individuals 
or populations, aim at maximizing. It seems that a common universal payoff function is required to 
unite the diverse models and to place the theory of games on a profound principle. Here this possibility 
is examined using statistical physics of open systems. 
 
3. Thermodynamic Formulation of Behavior 
 
The theory of games as it was formulated by von Neumann and expanded by Nash is founded on 
Boltzmann’s astounding idea that nature is in motion toward increasingly more probable states. 
Boltzmann adopted the probability concept from Descartes, Fermat, Pascal and others who had 
computed combinatorial possibilities in the context of gambling but Boltzmann could have also 
resorted to the posthumous paper [31] by the Reverend Bayes who had considered circumstantial 
possibilities in the context of collecting information [32]. It turns out that new insight to behavior and 
the payoff function can be obtained from a re-examination of the probability concept that Boltzmann 
placed as the cornerstone of his statistical mechanics.    
Boltzmann enumerated, just like counting pips on dice, the isoenergetic configurations that are 
commonly referred to as microstates. This invariant probability notion, here referred to as Cartesian, is 
constant in energy and thereby it corresponds to stationary systems. Hence the statistical theory, by 
founding solely upon this, is limited to changes in configurations of conserved systems. In contrast, the 
Bayesian probability P can be seen to vary due to changes in energetic conditions, and thereby it 
relates to evolutionary systems. Hence the statistical theory, based on the conditional probability 
notion, describes state changes of non-conserved systems. The equation of motion for an evolving 
system expresses the principle of increasing entropy 
 
 
,
ln 0 .t B t t j jk B
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In the context of game theory the rate of entropy increase dtS is the payoff function that values the 
outcomes of various jk-transactions where k-assets of players are transformed to j-assets of other 
players (and vice versa). For example, a player uses money in his possession to buy goods from 
another. The actions bring about changes dtNj in  the  j-assets of the player concurrently with changes 
dtNk in the k-assets  of  the  other  player.  In  fact  not  only  money  and  goods  are  rated  by  energy  
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differentials but literally everything is valued in terms of energy differentials. Therefore the holistic 
formalism is able to describe the behavior of complex systems just as of simple systems. The quest to 
consume free energy in least time is ubiquitous and independent of mechanisms. The overall sequence 
of transactions, referred to as the course of a game, advances move-by-move when the free energy Ajk 
= Dmjk – iDQjk is consumed. The term Dmjk = mj – Smk contains the scalar potential differences in the 
assets where mj = kBTln[Njexp(Gj/kBT)] is a function of the number Nj and value Gj of the j-asset. When 
the driving force contains only the potential differences, the system is closed to net flows of energy 
from its surroundings. In the corresponding zero-sum game the transactions between players bring 
about merely an exchange of assets but the total status over all players remains invariant. The invariant 
nature of zero-sum games is stated by the minimax theorem [33]. The term iDQjk in Eq. 1 is the energy 
influx from the surroundings to an open, extensive-form game. This term imposed by the surroundings 
distinguishes the statistical physics of open systems from the conventional formalism used by 
Boltzmann and others ever since. The influx, which is often equated with income, is incorporated in 
the assets by the players’ actions. Conversely, a player may lose his assets to the others as well as to 
the surroundings by misfortunate moves.  
A move by a player will cause a change in assets. The rate of change is proportional to the driving 
force Ajk by the coefficient sjk [13] 
 
 .t j jk jk B
k
d N A k Ts= -å  (2)  
 
When Ajk < 0, the jk-transaction will increase dtNj > 0, and vice versa. The particular functional form in 
Eq. 2 ensures that conservation of energy is satisfied in every move [12]. When Eq. 2 is inserted in Eq. 
1, entropy is found to increase almost everywhere dtS ≥ 0 because each square Ajk2 ≥ 0. This is the 
principle of increasing entropy.  
The proportionality coefficient sjk represents a particular mechanism that channels the jk-
transaction. For example, a more effective means of trading brings about faster changes in the assets. 
The rate is not immaterial because the driving force (Ajk) is, in turn, a function of assets (mj). In other 
words, behavior and the motives of behavior are inseparable from each other. Indeed, it is witnessed 
that when stakes are raised, behavior will change. For example, in the well known ultimatum game the 
probability of rejecting a share, whether fair or unfair, decreases with the increase of the absolute 
amount offered [34]. However, in classical game theory the amount of assets in players’ possession is 
customarily ignored. 
According to the physical portrayal of games more effective mechanisms are favored by the 
transactions themselves as they allow for a faster maximization of entropy. The quest to increase 
entropy in the least time is also known by the maximum entropy production principle [35]. According 
to the adopted self-similar thermodynamic formalism a game itself is also a mechanism that may 
evolve further to facilitate the overall consumption of free energy. In other words there are games 
being played within games, in accordance with hierarchical system theory [36]. For example, the 
behavior of a citizen amongst others can be regarded as a game that ultimately also contributes to 
international relations that, in turn, can be regarded as a game among nations. In the quest for the 
maximal dispersal of energy the systems will form a coalition, i.e., a larger system where it is more 
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effective in acquiring and consuming free energy and distributing the acquired flows among its 
constituent systems [37]. 
Moreover, the functional form of dtS in  Eq.  1  implies  that  the  particular  possessions  of  a  player  
affect not only their decisions but those of others as well. The product form of Eq. 1 states that actions 
(dtN) are inseparable from possessions (Ajk). This interdependency is the source of unpredictability 
when an open, extensive-form game is played by three or more parties [38]. The courses of non-
deterministic games vary and they do not necessarily end up with the same outcome because a move at 
any stage depends on past moves and conversely restricts the future choice of moves (Fig. 1). At the 
branching points, to be precise, the derivate đtS (Eq. 1) is  inexact.  In terms of physics the game is a 
non-Hamiltonian system with three or more degrees of freedom where the driving forces and energy 
flows are inseparable [12,39]. This thermodynamic interdependency between flows of energy and the 
free energy that drives all other flows underlies the interdependency between the strategy si and its 
complement, s-i, the strategies played by all other players. In other words, the thermodynamic theory 
gives  the  reason  why  the  decision  made  by  a  player  is  dependent  on  the  decisions  of  other  players,  
which, in turn, are dependent on the first player’s decision. In fact repeatedly changing conditions may 
drive repeated changes of strategies. For example, it has been shown that in a well studied game, the 
iterated continuous prisoner’s dilemma, no strategy is evolutionarily stable [40]. Moreover, the 
intractability of extensive-form games is understood as an inherent characteristic of open systems. 
Owing  to  the  net  influx  or  efflux  of  energy  to  or  from  the  system,  there  is  no  norm  and  hence  no  
unitary transformation either to obtain a solution or to predict the trajectory toward the solution 
concept. Even a minor move will perturb the energy content of the system and hence affect the future 
course. This is characteristic of chaotic games [41]. The sequence of moves, i.e., kinetics is, instead of 
using Eq. 2, often modeled by the deterministic law of mass action [42], but then thermodynamics and 
kinetics become incompatible with each other [12]. Alternatively, a sequence of moves is modeled as a 
Markov chain [43]. However, even when present probabilities depend on the past, the probabilities are 
not understood as physical.  
At  any  given  time  the  game,  described  as  a  natural  process,  can  be  assigned  with  the  additive  
logarithmic status measure known as entropy [12] 
 
 ln ln 1B B j B j jk B
j kj
S k P k P k N A k T
æ ö
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å åÕ  (3)  
 
over the product of probabilities Pj. Entropy will increase toward the steady state value Smax where all 
free energy terms Ajk =  0.  In  this  case  no  strategy,  i.e.,  no  choice  of  jk-moves can be found by any 
player to improve the distribution of assets Nj among the players or to acquire more assets from the 
surroundings. Customarily, the optimal behavior is referred to as the evolutionary stable strategy 
(ESS). The free energy minimum state can be proven stable against perturbations dNj using Eqs. 1 and 
3 in the Lyapunov criteria S(dNj) < 0 and dtS(dNj)/dt > 0 [44,45]. In other words, there is no action that 
could improve the status and no strategy that any player could play that would return a higher payoff, 
given all the strategies played by the other players.  
The steady-state partition of assets is given by the condition dtS = 0 which yields from Eq. 1 
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This is the condition of reaction equilibrium [26]. The dispersal of assets at the free energy minimum 
is a skewed, nearly log-normal distribution [14]. Indeed, studies of behavior in many-players games 
reveal that the strategies of individuals will evolve and the game will end up in a stationary state where 
only few have gathered large assets while most players must have settled for moderate possessions and 
relatively few have only little. Both the maximum and the amount of skew for a specific situation 
depend on the overall energy content of the system (Fig. 1). This is familiar from the distributions of 
ecosystems [46] and economic systems [47] and from partitions of elementary chemical and physical 
systems [48].   
 
 
 
  
Figure 1. Extensive-form game branching on the left side is depicted on the right 
side as a natural process that brings about changes in diverse assets, indicated by the 
solids, that correspond to populations Nj on energy levels Gj. As denoted, move by 
move, by arrows in the sequence of state changes (A – D) the payoff function as 
entropy increases until a solution concept corresponding to a stationary state of free 
energy minimum has been attained. This maximum entropy partition as a 
thermodynamic steady state is an evolutionary stable solution concept where the net 
dissipation  (wavy  arrows)  vanishes.  No  move  is  able  to  bring  more  assets,  i.e.,  
energy to the process that settles to the evolutionary stable state. 
 
  8 
 
 
The optimal distribution given by Eq. 4 is the result of a natural process just as it is the outcome of 
an extensive-form game. However, it is worth emphasizing that at the steady state there are no net 
fluxes  to  or  from the  systems just  as  the  players’  total  assets  at  a  particular  solution  concept  are  no  
longer changing. This parallels the fixed-energy condition of stationary systems. It means that even 
though  the  outcomes  of  repeated  games  differ,  each  of  them  is  a  feasible  solution  concept,  i.e.,  the  
minimax condition [1] just as in a zero-sum game is satisfied for all players. Also, the proof of the folk 
theorem [2] rests on the invariant nature of an outcome [49]. 
 
4. Motives of Behavior 
 
Is it reasonable, as argued above, to equate incentives of behavior with the imperative to increase 
entropy? Would not the association of animate actions with the physical principle of decreasing free 
energy quench all degrees of freedom from behavior? These and other concerns about the use of rate of 
entropy increase as the universal payoff function deserve to be addressed. 
According to the naturalistic tenet, behavior is, just like any other natural process, limited by the 
free energy because a more generous stance would violate the conservation of energy. In other words, 
the free energy sums up all resources that an individual or any other agent has in possession or access 
to with its available mechanisms. Beyond that no one can act. This superior role of free energy is 
apparent, for example, from actions that a social system is able to take when fostering its subordinate 
individuals whereas an individual, even a rich one, rarely has enough power to act against society for 
any significant periods of time. The thermodynamic description of behavior as an energy transduction 
process leaves all of the available pathways open for conduction, but there is the natural bias for the 
best path, known also as a geodesic, that will diminish free energy as soon as possible [50]. Staying on 
an optimal trajectory requires both incessant evaluation of alternative pathways and redirection after 
each choice. In other words the game is changing as it is played. Thus behavior cannot be reduced to 
precisely predictable sequence of acts.  
The rate of entropy increase in the least time (Eq. 1) as the motive of behavior measures all 
available sources of free energy (Ajk)  weighted  by  rates  of  their  consumption  (dtNj). In this sense 
entropy, just like utility, considers numerous variables that influence behavior. However, since the 
payoff function of the rate of entropy increase evaluates everything in terms of energy, it makes all 
motives  of  behavior  commensurable  with  each  other.  In  practice,  though,  it  may  be  difficult  to  
accurately assign an energetic value to every option, but in a statistical sense the behavior itself reveals 
the current value of a strategy. Nonetheless, it is legitimate to question whether a single number can 
possibly sum up all, at times even conflicting, motives of behavior and eventually to anticipate 
behavior. The answer is yes only in the statistical sense. The statistical notion is applicable when any 
one move will not change the course of game too much. In physical terms, the condition is valid when 
the consumption of Ajk is small in comparison to the average energy content in the system kBT. 
However, events where Ajk ≈ kBT, may be infrequent, but they do happen. This long-tail trait of a 
probability distribution is characteristic of natural processes [51]. When S = kBlnP (Eq.  3)  is  not  a  
sufficient statistic for kBT, the state of a game is given best by the probability [12,39] 
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The  exponential  form  reveals  that  any  one  Pj, for which Ajk = Dmjk – iDQjk t kBT, contributes 
substantially to P. The jk-move corresponding to the consumption of Ajk will change Pj significantly, 
i.e., beyond the statistical approximation lnNj! ≈ NjlnNj – Nj which is applicable to large, quasi-
stationary populations. In this case the probability of a small system will not evolve smoothly but 
moves in steps according to dtP = LP (Eq. 1). In practice this means that the rate of entropy increase 
cannot be used to extrapolate a specific scenario. For example, when an individual labeled with j 
happens to strike a particularly prosperous deal, his status measured by Pj will step up abruptly. 
Nevertheless, the status P of  the  overall  course  of  the  game,  comprising  many  players,  will  remain  
sufficiently statistical and it will not be affected all that much by a single move but moves smoothly.  
The description of a game as a natural process is holistic so that any jk-move will, in principle, 
affect the status of any other player. The physical probability in Eq. 5 defines, by jk-indexing, the 
interdependency among the densities-in-energy. A pair or a set of decisions are referred to as strategic 
complements when they are constructively reinforcing one another and as strategic substitutes when 
they are destructive in offsetting one another. The course of a game depends on coherent moves, which 
in terms of physics, means that the flows of energy interfere with each other when the affine, curved 
energy landscape is in evolution toward the stationary-state flatness [52,53]. Both sequential and 
simultaneous moves are accommodated in the formulation (Eq. 1) but since velocities of energy flows 
are limited, ultimately by the speed of light, only the sequential actions display causality [39] to affect 
subsequent decisions whereas simultaneous moves are independent, which is a familiar notion in 
sealed first-price auctions. Moreover, individual behavior via social interactions has been understood 
as the mechanism that bonds together the affine energy landscape and generates its evolution [54]. 
The physical probability that is conditioned in energetic terms (Eq. 5) clarifies also why mimicking 
(imitation) is often a successful strategy. A priori, i.e., at an initial state it may not be obvious which 
particular move will consume free energy in the least time but pioneers will search for paths, e.g., by 
trial and error. Initially the optimality of a path is less important because just about any strategy will 
produce entropy. Moreover since no experience, i.e. references, has been accumulated, the optimality 
cannot be assessed. Therefore a successor, when mimicking the established behavior, will follow, if 
not  the  best,  at  least  a  reasonable  trail  formed  by  the  path  breakers.  Explorations  are  per  definition  
suboptimal moves. This is consistent with rational ignorance [55] which states that the act of acquiring 
information on the best possible strategy or path may be too costly compared to expected and uncertain 
benefits to the player. The thermodynamic theory shows that the mere move to set a path will change 
the setting for subsequent moves as well [56]. The probabilities of future decisions are affected by past 
acts, in other words a specific state of a game depends on its history. The conditional interdependence 
among strategies is also familiar from cemented suboptimal standards. It is tedious to improve a 
widely adopted standard simply because initial payoff will suffer from the limited scope of 
applicability of the reform. Conversely, marginal benefits for conformists are easily available, whereas 
significant gains are in the sight of a rebel. The conventional way of thinking as an established means 
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of energy dispersal is preferred rather than making much additional effort to explore beyond 
paradigms. Players are motivated to explore new strategies when they see a possibility for greater 
payoffs, i.e., a larger perceived gradient in free energy than is consumed by the study itself. New 
strategies may emerge from intentional manipulation or sporadic fluctuations also known as random 
variations. For the payoff, i.e. the entropy increase, it does not matter whether the move is intentional 
or accidental, since only the outcome is valued. The changes may be, for example, mutations in a 
biological context or reorganizations in the brain in a decision making context. When a game is 
maturing toward a solution concept, most new strategies are not so successful, but some may still tap 
into potentials better than competitors and gain ground.  
 
5. Discussion 
 
Game theory accounts for behavior in remarkably diverse circumstances, yet it is pertinent to ask 
what behavior actually is. Game theory rationalizes behavior by modeling it as a game that aims at 
maximizing payoff. However, the nature of a game as a process and its objective has remained 
obscure. Here games are described as natural processes that increase entropy in the least time. This 
tenet, while founded on the 2nd law of thermodynamics as the universal principle, may at first appear 
superficial and deficient as if it was neglecting important factors such as the role and asymmetric 
distribution of information among players. However, the naturalistic view is holistic in relating 
everything  to  everything  in  terms  of  energy.  As  the  flow  of  energy  is  the  sole  means  of  conveying  
information, this means that a piece of information is also an asset. This stance is valid because any 
form of information is bound to its physical representation [57,58,59], which, in turn, is subject to the 
laws of thermodynamics. Furthermore, the accumulation of information, e.g., a learning process itself, 
can be understood as a natural process of formation and changing of paths (geodesics) for flows of 
energy that represent information. Therefore, the value of information gained by behaving in a certain 
way, i.e., by playing a certain strategy which acquires information for the future accumulation of assets 
has to be accounted for. Therefore a change in strategy is a natural consequence of accumulating assets 
because the acquired assets open new opportunities for the reduction of free energy. The acquisition of 
information about other players’ types, e.g., to account for a Bayesian game [60], is contained in the 
physical formulation of games as natural processes. This physical correspondence is also reflected in 
the purification theorem. It states that mixed strategy equilibria can be obtained as the limit of pure 
strategy equilibria from a perturbed game of incomplete information. Physically speaking, a mixed 
state can be constructed as the limit of pure states that are perturbed by energy in mutual interactions. 
Information is energy in interactions, when defined in thermodynamic [58] rather than mathematical 
[61] terms.  
The intimate interdependency between behavior and its motives, that are, physically speaking, 
flows of energy and free energy, is apparent when acquired knowledge is used to anticipate moves by 
others. The extensive-form game where knowledge is accumulated is directed toward a self-confirming 
equilibrium [62] just as a natural process spontaneously progresses toward a stable state. An extensive 
series of repeated games will eventually reveal, in mutual transactions, all characteristics of all players. 
Thus all conceivable paths of actions are open to maximize the total payoff. This revelation shifts the 
steady state from the Bayes-Nash equilibrium to the ultimate optimum [63,64]. This tedious 
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optimization procedure relates to computational complexity [65]. There is no algorithm that would 
solve this non-deterministic polynomial time problem [66]. At the Lyapunov-stable state there are no 
unexposed assets and no strategies that could possibly shift the equilibrium any further.  
The extensive-form game models the fact that behavior depends on surrounding conditions. A 
change in the surroundings relates to changes in the values of a payoff matrix, and more efficient 
strategies to which higher payoffs are available may emerge. Any such change will bring instability to 
the game. The approach of the new equilibrium may even be chaotic because any early move will 
affect the set of moves available in the future. Moreover, when a particularly effective strategy is 
found and executed, it may consume assets more rapidly than they are replenished. Consequently, after 
a period of overexploitation, the system must retract and abandon the once so lucrative, but 
unsustainable strategy. For this reason animal populations oscillate and economic cycles follow one 
another.  
The connection between the entropy maximum and game theoretical equilibrium is, as such, not a 
novel proposition [67]. However, here the rate of entropy increase is provided in a mathematical form 
that is equivalent to the rate of free energy decrease. This is essential. Since everything can be valued 
in terms of energy, the rate of entropy increase qualifies as the universal payoff function. Moreover, 
statistical physics of open systems links the principle of increasing entropy to the principle of least 
action which guides processes along the optimal paths that bring the system to the stationary state in 
the least time. Admittedly, just like free energy, entropy in a complicated system is a function of many 
variables that are indexed by j and k.  In this way entropy as the additive figure of merit  is  of course 
very much in line with observations that human and other animate behavior is difficult, if not 
impossible, to account solely on the basis of a single motive. While justified by the profound principle 
it may be tedious to expand the entropy function in every detail to model practical situations. Rather it 
would seem sensible to model only the terms that are anticipated to be significant in decisions that are 
confronted in specified circumstances. However, thermodynamics clarifies that no precise predictions 
are available even from very detailed formulation because the moves themselves will change the 
conditions and prompt different moves. Moreover, the physical portrayal of games as natural processes 
by the rate of entropy increase as the payoff function gives justification for mixed and varying 
strategies over pure and fixed strategies. Diversity in behavior, like biodiversity, allows the entire 
system to consume free energy more and faster than would be possible via individual and invariant 
strategies.  
Entropy as the payoff function also clarifies the subjective nature of decision making when 
choosing a strategy because payoff is a function of the possessions and moves that are available for a 
specific player. Moreover, in hopes of making a rational choice the player, who is equipped with 
appropriate knowledge, may discount a future payoff when making present-day decisions. Thus there 
is no universal rational choice, which is why some actions may seem irrational to an outside observer. 
In this sense the thermodynamic theory addresses some of the critical concerns about rational choice 
[68]. Furthermore, physical formalism does not allow for observations without interactions. Therefore 
an observer will inevitably affect, i.e., integrate himself in, the course of a game. Common values are 
approached via integration where superior free energy possessions and effective consumption 
strategies acquired by energy-intense players tend to impose on others what is deemed as rational, 
when in fact much of this “rationality” is in fact mimicry and submission to authority. 
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The physical portrayal of games as natural processes illuminates not only competition over assets 
but also cooperation among individuals. A coalition is regarded as a strategy, just as any other 
mechanism to increase entropy. The group possesses more means and more assets to access higher 
status in entropy than any one individual could master independently. The consensus in decision 
making is motivated only if it provides the means for each individual to attain a higher entropic status 
than would be available by independent moves. It is not unusual that, when circumstances change, 
coalitions will expire or reorganize to adapt to the new circumstances. This understanding adds to the 
ongoing debate concerning the emergence of cooperation, to which several solutions have been 
proposed [69,70]. Parameterization of models with a physical quantity may help to distinguish the type 
of game, for example snowdrift or prisoner’s dilemma, to represent a situation. 
Finally, the tragedy of the commons [71] that has also been analyzed by game theory [72] deserves 
clarification. The detrimental scenario that is driven by short-sighted individual incentives continues 
when resources and means of social bonding are insufficient. This alerting sequence of moves toward 
ruination is understood by the thermodynamic theory as probable. According to the natural law, when 
energy in the surrounding supplies falls, due to exploitation by individuals, below that contained in the 
social system, the flow of energy is redirected according to the 2nd law away from the society to the 
surroundings. Consequently, the social system keeps draining its cohesion just when it would 
desperately need more energy to re-establish vital mechanisms such as social bonding to enforce co-
operation that would be necessary for society to behave in a sustainable manner.  
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